A Study on Fostering Reserve Forces Capable of Demonstrate the Ability to Immediately Respond of the Korean Armed Forces
Military
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Abstract
Purpose: The main purpose of this article is to explore the plan to foster the experts in reserve forces of the Korean armed forces based on a review of the operation of reserve forces in foreign countries, such as the United States and Germany, in consideration of the rapidly changing international situation and security changes on the Korean Peninsula following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is intended to examine the relevant development, and at the same time, while there are differences in terms of policy and implementation aspects, it is intended to make suggestions regarding policy development by deriving implications through the comparative analysis of the reserve forces system of Korea and the United States.Method: Considering the characteristics of this study, it was primarily composed of literature studies such as official documents, research papers, and related degree dissertations of the Korean and U.S. governments, Internet materials. As examples of the development of reserve forces in foreign countries, including the United States, case analysis of the reserve forces service system and organization method, reserve forces training, etc., were used. Based on which, various implications were drawn for fostering the reserve forces experts for Korea's elite reserve force.
Result: For emphasis purposes, the U.S. and Germany legally maintain the same status as active duty and reserve forces. This is because budgeting and policy establishment for reserve forces are applied in the same manner as in active duty. In particular, the U.S. develops and applies the AGR and ADOS systems based on the legal basis and budget, and operates the reserve force as a unit from the peacetime. However, Korea is currently conducting a short mobilization call training for three days and two nights. In case of emergency, after the general mobilization order is issued, the unit enters into the relevant unit to increase the mobilization and establish the unit. Moving forward, it is necessary to train the reserve forces experts who can contribute to shortening the gap between peacetime and when the general mobilization order is issued.
Conclusion: The lessons learned from the Russo-Ukraine war are the spirit of armed struggle from the leader to the people, the strategy and tactics to operate the weapon system, and above all, the very importance of mobilizing the reserve force that can demonstrate practical combat power in the battlefield in case of emergency. As such, it is very important to prepare a plan for fostering the reserve forces experts in consideration of changes in the international order in the 21st century, declining population, changes in war patterns such as hybrid warfare shown in the Russo-Ukraine war, and Korea's future defense environment, among the key tasks of the Defense Reform 4.0.
Keywords: Russo-Ukraine War, Changes in the Defense Environment, Elite Reserve Forces, Non-Standing Reserve Forces System, Defense Reform 4.0
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? Source: kookbang.dema.mil.kr